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PRACTICING PSYCHOTHERAPY
IN A SPIRITUAL CONTEXT

Wherefore, verily I say unto you that all things unto me
are spiritual, and not at any time have I given unto you a
law which was temporal; neither any man, nor the children of men; neither Adam, your father, whom I created.

-D&C29:34
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For persons embarking on any rational, scholarly, or scientific
endeavor, the presupposition of lawful orderliness seems
inescapable. With this presupposition in place, we are afforded the
metaphysical backdrop against which a coherent and systematic
account of the physical universe may be formulated. Without the
presupposition of orderliness, no successful endeavor toward systematic and coherent knowledge would seem likely or even worth
pursuit in the first place, since the universe would be characterized
by only randomness and capriciousness. The presupposition of
orderliness, in short, enables the generation of orderly knowledge.
Moreover, prima facie evidence gives us no reason to doubt the
remarkable orderliness of the world, delicately formed with lawful
regularity, harmonious ecological systems, and multiple levels of
organization. From our everyday experience, we possess a knowledge of the predictable manner in which objects and entities tend to
move and operate. From physics' laws of motion, we can accurately
predict the movement of an object, given a knowledge of its initial
conditions (e.g., location and velocity); from chemistry we can
confidently predict the outcome of chemical combinations such as
nitroglycerin and kieselguhr (dynamite); from biology and medicine we have dependable knowledge of how anatomical structures
and systems such as the human circulatory system routinely operate
and, under certain circumstances, fail to operate. Finally, and more
broadly, we see how (according to some construals) physics, chemistry, biology, and "special" sciences, such as economics, psychology,
and sociology (among others; see Fodor, 1981) fit into a monolithic,
though tidy and well-organized, hierarchy of sciences, often with
one providing the ontological foundation for the next (e.g., the theorizing of August Comte, 1988).
Because the world appears to be so orderly and because the
assumption of lawfulness is taken so seriously in the physical sciences, it is not surprising that the social and behavioral sciences
have come to view their subject-the human being-as a mere natural object that operates in accordance with this same lawful necessity. Perhaps Voltaire, the well-known French philosopher, best
captured this idea when he remarked:
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It would be very singular that all nature, all the planets, should

obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal, five feet
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high, who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely
according to his caprice. (As quoted in Robinson, 1986, p. 298)
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Should we flatly and uncritically presuppose that human
beings, as one more bit of ontological baggage in a lawful, orderly
universe, operate in necessarily lawful, orderly, and utterly predictable ways? And if human beings are subject to natural laws in
much the same way as any other natural object in the universe, how
do we, as Latter-day Saint scientists and practitioners, reconcile
important gospel principles, such as moral agency and divine intervention, with a deterministic scientific framework? Should such a
reconciliation be performed?
In what follows, we will address these concerns by clarifying the
meaning of human action and the practice of psychotherapy, first,
under the concept of natural or scientific law (terms that we will
equate for the moment), and second, under what we refer to as
gospel law. We will make several key distinctions between these two
broad conceptions of law and outline the implications that each
conception holds for the idea of human existence, as well as for the
idea of a professional, therapeutic relationship. In so doing, we will
make a case for one possible reconciliation of gospel law and orderliness that, we think, is consistent with Latter-day Saint doctrine
and our overall thesis. Finally, we will discuss our reconciliation's
implications for the practice of psychotherapy.
What Is a Law of Nature?

The belief that the universe operates according to lawful regularities is widely acknowledged by scientists and lay persons alike.
Although contemporary physics has long acknowledged quantum
mechanics and relativity theory (e.g., Zukav, 1979), these developments mayor may not have implications for psychological science;
one prominent theoretical psychologist suggests that they may not
(Robinson, 1984). Others have suggested that much of contemporary psychological science still operates under a Newtonian model
where human action is thought to be fully determined by that subset of natural laws and forces pertaining to human beings (e.g.,
Slife, 1993).
Despite the ubiquity of the concept of natural law, the question
of what precisely is meant by law of nature is difficult to answer. In
12

many cases, the term law of nature refers to a universal, scientific
principle that governs or determines the whole of the physical
world, a principle such as the "law" of gravity, Newton's laws of
motion, the laws of thermodynamics, and so on. There are more
circumscribed scientific laws as well, such as Stevens's power law
(loudness grows in proportion to intensity raised to the power of
0.67) and the Bell-Magendie law (the separation of sensory and
motor functions of the spinal cord).
Textbooks and trade books in the behavioral sciences vary in
their definitions of the concept of scientific or natural law but commonly converge on one of two varieties: (a) laws are theories that
have been so well supported that they are taken to be universally
true (Bordens & Abbott, 1999, p. 465; Herzog, 1996, p. 11; Pelham,
1999, p. 29), and (b) laws are empirically observed regularities that,
once quantified, require a theory to explain them (Bordens &
Abbott, 1999, p. 465; McBurney, 1994, p. 36; Singleton, Straits, Straits,
& McAllister, 1988, p. 23). Some have argued that laws are central to
science because they describe (or perhaps explain) functional reiationships between two or more genuine phenomena in such a way
that we are afforded a clearer, often mathematical, understanding of
them (e.g., Fechner's law; see Robinson, 1995). Perhaps the most
sophisticated rendering of this approach to scientific law comes
from the work of Carl Hempel (1965), whose hypothetico-deductive
explanatory model serves for many as the ultimate goal of science
(Robinson, 1986). Opposite this approach to lawfulness are eliminative laws (i.e., nomological reductions; see Hyland, 1995; see also
Churchland, 1986), which seek the reduction of our ontology (what
we assume to have real existence) to one kind of fundamental substance-often physical matter-such that only one set of laws is
needed, rather than possible multiple sets of laws that obtain at
different levels of physical organization.
Clearly scientists and philosophers are not in complete agreement regarding the nature of a scientific or natural law per se.
Bearing in mind the variety of ways with which scientists and
philosophers are prone to use the concept of law in their work, we
can nevertheless identify a common conceptual thread that runs
through many definitions seen in the behavioral science literature,
rendering them largely equivalent. The common thread to which
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we refer is adequately described in Blackwell's entry on law of
nature in A Companion to Metaphysics (Kim & Sosa, 1995):
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It is widely held by both scientists and philosophers that our universe is governed by scientific laws and that it is one of the primary aims of science to discover these laws.... Lawful regularities
are said to be in some sense necessary and capable of bestowing
some kind of necessity on events which they subsume. The necessity is sufficient to support COUNTERFACTUALS. (p. 266)

This definition suggests at least four things about "natural lawfulness" as the concept is used in science: (a) The concept of natural
law takes us to the realm of metaphysics, where we are confronted
with the philosophical question What is the ultimate nature of reality? If the axiom expressed in Blackwell's definition is true, then
nature consists, at least in part, of the existence of fundamental laws
that govern the properties of objects and entities that said laws are
thought to cover. Laws of nature are, in this sense, part and parcel of
the organization and operation of the universe. (b) Laws of nature
usher in a kind of necessity where physical events in the universe
could not operate in any way other than that which is determined or
described by a given law-there are no exceptions. (c) Laws of
nature support counterfactual conditionals (i.e., contrary-to-fact
conditionals, or if-then statements where the "if" portion of the
premise is known to be false), which means that the laws should
obtain universally, not just in cases where they have been historically corroborated (e.g., if the volume were decreased by .33 in a
hypothetical cylinder [even though it was not], then its pressure
would have exerted 44.1 pounds per square inch). (d) If natural laws
do not themselves determine or govern the whole of physical reality,
then they are at least factual descriptions of the orderly, predictable
manner in which objects and entities do operate.
Human Beings under Natural Law
It is the above characterization that we will henceforth refer to
as natural law and that we will now address in light of its implications for ordinary human activity. Our principal question is as follows: Do natural laws, which are thought to determine the physical
universe, determine human beings as well, thereby obviating the
14

theoretical possibility that humans may act by what are commonly
taken to be their own agentive powers? Surely from the orthodox
scientific perspective described above, we must answer this question
in the affirmative, for as philosophical psychologists have observed,
"The notion of 'free will' in a determined universe violates every
canon of parsimony, scientific unity, objectivity, and positivism"
(Robinson, 1986, p. 452). "Put bluntly, if the will is truly free, then
there can be no lawlike generalizations about it to be had" (Green,
2000, p. 63). This notion of lawful necessity is clearly taken for
granted in behavioral science research texts that posit a determined
universe, including predictable and controlled human beings, as a
central axiom of science.
So far, little of this discussion should be surprising to those who
have been trained in science and who are well acquainted with its
fundamental canons. The assumption of orderliness is taken to be a
prime prerequisite in accruing knowledge, and science's long pursuit of natural laws is a logical extension of this assumption. But it
also behooves us, as Latter-day Saint scientists and practitioners, to
consider the consequences of this canon so boldly stated yet so
often uncritically accepted. Because others have already competently identified and explored the implications of an approach to
behavioral science that assumes lawful necessity and the automaticity of human action, we will briefly review what are, for our purposes, the six most crucial implications.
The first implication of natural law as a foundational principle
in behavioral science is the loss of personal responsibility (Rychlak,
1979; Slife & Williams, 1995). If human beings operate according to
natural laws and thus possess no innate volitional ability, then (as
the classic example goes) their activity is no more purposive than
that of a rock rolling down a hill, which moves merely in accordance
with the laws-motion, gravity, and so on-that are thought to
govern the entire physical universe.
A second implication of natural law is the loss of meaning
(Gantt & Reber, 1999; Slife & Williams, 1995, pp. 14-64; Slife &
Gantt, 1999). Ifhuman beings operate according to natural laws and
thus possess no innate volitional ability, then their activity is no
more meaningful than that of the above-mentioned rock, which is
not ordinarily thought to be operating in any meaningful way.

yospel
Law

and
'Natural
Law

15

Turning
'Freud
Upside
CJ)own

This is to suggest that the meaning of an act derives in large measure from the purpose or intention of the initiating agent.
A third implication of natural law is the loss of morality (Gantt &
Reber, 1999; Williams & Gantt, 2002). In a universe with no intrinsic meaning and no human moral agents to consider consequences, to make informed choices between options, and to
recognize (and perhaps correct) mistakes when committed, there
can be nothing in the lives of human beings that reasonably resembles any action that could be considered "moral"; rather, all activity
is in some sense neutral. It just is, like any other natural eventultimately a mere instance or by-product of the universal law that
necessitated it.
A fourth implication of natural law is pernicious pessimism
(James, 189711956; 190711978). The loss of agency and its corollaries-loss of personal responsibility, meaning, and morality-brings
with it the loss of hope, the onset of a destructive pessimism, and,
indeed, the paradoxical situation where we find ourselves locked in
a universe where we can be deeply regretful of an act yet unable to
have acted otherwise in order to avoid the regretted act in the first
place. Moreover, our lack of agency precludes the possibility of
ameliorating our action in the future in any way, thus making future
error unavoidable. This paradox was presented in William James's
famous dilemma of determinism (189711956), a dilemma which
seemed so preposterous to James that he rejected the doctrine of
determinism upon which it was based and affirmed unadulterated
free will, a "melioristic" doctrine that allowed for the possibility of
loose play in what appears to be a fixed and determined universe
and for the possibility that human beings could be thus afforded the
freedom required to improve the quality of their lives (James,
189711956; 19 0711978).

A fifth implication of natural law is that at least one part of Latterday Saint doctrine is false. Prophets and, indeed, the body of scriptures accepted by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as
inspired have adhered to the principle that human beings, as children of God, are given the gift of moral agency. This is not an
obscure principle known only to a few General Authorities and
scholars of ancient and modern scripture; it is a principle taught
from baptism (or even before baptism). Of course, the concept of
16

agency may mean different things to different Church members, but
there seems no reason to debate the many scriptures in which human
agency is described as an essential part of the gospel, for example:
All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it,
to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence. Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is the condemnation of man; because that which was from the beginning is plainly
manifest unto them, and they receive not the light. (D&C 93:30-31)
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A sixth and final implication of natural law is the loss of spirituality itself. Other commentators have shown that the assumptions
of modernist science, including that of a closed universe controlled by natural law, are at odds with the notion of a spiritual universe (Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999). To argue in favor of a closed
universe governed exclusively by natural law is to argue against a
world wherein the sacred, spiritual, and miraculous can exist. In
a closed, naturalistic universe, there is no God to transcend what we
take to be the ordinary workings of nature-that is, to create or set
apart the sacred, to bring spirituality to our lives, to work miracles,
and so forth. If we accept the concepts of naturalism and natural
law as they are commonly understood in the behavioral science literature, nothing can transcend nature because nothing but impersonal nature exists, from the most overarching laws to the smallest
particles of matter.
This brief sketch of the consequences of the concept of natural
law is meant to suggest that Latter-day Saint scholars should be concerned with the philosophical question of human agency versus
lawful necessity. It is our assessment that the general picture of
human existence under a strict natural conception is one that
brings with it the impossibility of a meaningful, moral, and spiritual
life where we may, through our agency-in conjunction with the
grace of Jesus Christ, whose atonement permits the possibility that
we may be "ameliorated" and washed clean-strive toward a
Christian ideal.
Psychotherapy's Ambivalence and Natural Law
If the aforementioned consequences of natural law hold for
human beings in general, then what are the consequences for counseling and psychotherapy in a Latter-day Saint context? Ultimately,
17
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we will show that these consequences-the loss of agency, personal
responsibility, meaning, and morality-are borne out in the psychotherapeutic relationship as well. Because psychotherapy and
counseling are driven by scientific findings that are undergirded by
natural law, the implications of naturalism are inextricably tied, at
least theoretically, to the practice of psychotherapy.
However, the idea of counseling and psychotherapy as practices
devoid of agency, personal responsibility, and meaning may seem
counterintuitive to practitioners, especially to Latter-day Saint
practitioners. What sort of psychotherapist-LDS or otherwisewould deny the client's freedom, autonomy, and personal meaning?
That this question arises at all in the minds of practitioners demonstrates their commitment to specific assumptions about positive
mental health and psychotherapy that are incompatible with the
notion of natural lawfulness.
For instance, in a commonly cited survey of mental health practitioners-including clinical psychologists, marriage and family
therapists, social workers, and psychiatrists-common psychotherapy values clustering around agency, freedom, and autonomy
emerged. The survey reported specific psychotherapy values that
practitioners considered important in the guidance and evaluation
of psychotherapy with all or many clients (Jensen & Bergin, 1988).
These values include "one's sense of being a free agent; having a
sense of identity and feelings of worth; being skilled in interpersonal communication, sensitivity and nurturance; being genuine
and honest; having self-control and personal responsibility" (p. 295).
Clearly, these commonly endorsed psychotherapy values include
rather than exclude notions of agency, responsibility, and morality.
Furthermore, the Jensen and Bergin (1988) survey findings are consistent with other assessments of practitioner values. In delineating
what he considered "essential therapist values," Hans Strupp (1980)
included "the dual goal of personal freedom and human relatedness. With regard to the former, it extols individual autonomy,
responsibility, fairness, decency, and honesty in interpersonal relations" (p. 399). Thus, many therapists assume that human beings
are fundamentally moral agents, and they conduct their clinical
work in a manner consistent with that assumption.

If therapists often practice in a manner that encourages client
freedom, autonomy, and responsibility, then why perform a critical
examination of scientific law and naturalism within counseling and
psychotherapy? From our perspective, a critical examination of
scientific law and naturalism is salient for two reasons.
First, the assumptions that inform the behavioral sciences in
general, of which counseling and psychotherapy are a part, can
influence us in ways that are not always explicit. Without careful
analysis, it is easy to appeal to worldly ideas that lead us afield, even
when we have the best of intentions. This is not necessarily to say
that we should abandon the entirety of psychological, scientific,
and scholarly knowledge and that we should never try to understand the natural and social worlds of which we are a part, but it is
to say that the fundamental assumptions and theoretical starting
points of our scholarly and practical projects, as well as our conclusions, should not flatly contradict principles, such as agency, that
we know to be true.
Furthermore, even if practitioners do assume agency, morality,
and related topics as guides to the therapeutic encounter, the
research and theories that are expected to drive counseling and psychotherapy are informed by a science that rests on naturalistic
assumptions. This situation, of course, is highly paradoxical and
may be the crux of the infamous research-practice schism in the
discipline. Ultimately, we are left with a situation in which many
therapists base their practice on an assumption of agency in spite of
their formal training and in spite of subscribing to naturalistic
assumptions (Williams, 1998).
A second reason for critically examining natural law conceptions within psychotherapy is that concerned practitioners need to
be conscious of the disparity-in all its manifestations-between a
theistic and a naturalistic conception of science and psychotherapy.
If the contemporary assumptions regarding human nature, psychotherapy, and science are inconsistent with the tenets of the
restored gospel at the most fundamental level, then a theoretical
foundation consistent with the restored gospel must be explicitly
formulated. That is, we should not be content with merely ignoring
our training and the disciplines of counseling and psychotherapy, but
rather we should be actively striving toward an explicit, systematic,
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and well-thought-out approach to counseling and psychotherapy
that is consistent with our most fundamental beliefs.
For this reason, we present the implications and consequences
for therapy that logically follow from the tenets of natural law. We
do not assume that all therapists practice in the manner outlined
here. Nevertheless, the therapeutic implications discussed are the
inevitable outcome of psychotherapy under natural law, whether
therapists practice according to these principles or not.
Psychotherapy under Natural Law
From a naturalistic perspective, lawful necessity is presumed to
cover both normal and abnormal behaviors. Regarding abnormal
behaviors, the discipline has developed a scientific classification system that describes different categories of diagnoses that are based
upon a disease model of mental illness. We are referring here to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV),
authored by the American Psychiatric Association (1994).
The DSM-IV is premised upon natural law. If diagnosed, persons
are presumed to manifest a disease process characterized by a
specific and consistent symptom pattern. The diagnostic categories
themselves are designed to be static and objective representations of
an external reality-in this case, the "reality" of mental illness.
Hence, the therapist can predict the course and outcome of the disease, because the client's behavior is expected to conform to the predictable and stable pattern that characterizes the diagnosis. These
diagnoses are then assumed to be universal and generalizable.
Although exceptions to this universalism may be thought to occur
in certain circumscribed cases (as in the case of culturally different
clients), the diagnoses themselves are presumed to cut across contexts. In this way, the diagnostic system is a lawlike and universal
system in the vein of naturalism.
If therapists utilize the DSM-Ivas it is intended to be used (i.e., as
a universal category system), clients can suffer detrimental effects.
When therapists use the diagnostic system as a means of understanding the client, they are less likely to see client behaviors that
contradict characteristic behaviors of the particular disorder.
Indeed, therapists only "see" client behaviors that are consistent
with the diagnostic description. Ultimately, such a universal
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classificatory system sabotages client agency. If therapists categorize
a client through diagnosis, the overarching, lawful reality of the
diagnosis eclipses the client; the client is not perceived to be or act
other than what the diagnosis indicates. In this case, the client can
never exceed the boundaries of the diagnosis.
Some may argue that the use of the DSM-IV categories is descriptive, rather than explanatory as we suggest. However, given the
axiomatic assumptions inherent in the diagnostic system, it is a
quick and seductively easy step from viewing diagnoses as descriptive to viewing them as explanatory or real. Consider an example
case, which is based on an actual client of the second author of this
paper. The client, whom we will call Jack, is forced by the court to
attend group psychotherapy because he committed various acts of
domestic violence. Through therapeutic work and assessment with
Jack, the group leaders converge upon a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder as the most accurate representation of Jack's
pathology. He consistently manifests antisocial symptoms in his
interactions with others. For instance, he may exploit and manipulate others for his own personal benefit without any semblance of
remorse, and if other group members confront these behaviors,
Jack vehemently denies their truth.
What if Jack briefly changes his seemingly characteristic pattern? Suppose Jack abruptly, yet genuinely, acknowledges his
responsibility for hurting others but then returns to his characteristic pattern of denying responsibility. Will the group therapist recognize the change as a real change consciously initiated by Jack, or will
she explain the change as merely a veiled aspect of his underlying
and stable disorder? These questions hinge upon whether we view
the diagnosis as a greater reality and truth than Jack himself. When
clients are resistant to change, seemingly stuck in their old dysfunctional behavior patterns (as Jack is), it is particularly tempting to
invoke the explanatory power of the DSM diagnoses.
When the diagnosis defines Jack, his possibilities for change are
limited. In this case, therapists are at risk of becoming hopeless
about Jack and his prognosis. This is indicative of the "pernicious
pessimism" ushered in by natural law. The therapist cannot maintain an optimistic belief in the possibility for change because Jack's
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behavior is already determined by the course of the pathology. We
might wonder, Why attempt psychotherapy at all with such a client?
Some therapists may resist our characterization of the DSM-IV
system and its potential effects. In practice, for instance, not all psychotherapists treat the DSM-IV categories as lawful descriptions of
client behavior. Indeed, some therapists refuse to diagnose clients
on the grounds that such categories label and ultimately limit
clients. Others minimize the importance that diagnoses have for
treatment. In the case of Jack, for example, some therapists might
argue that it is crucial to maintain hopefulness for the possibility of
Jack's changing. Indeed, part of the goal of psychotherapy is to
facilitate the change process. While we are sympathetic to such an
optimistic therapeutic position, the naturalistic assumptions that
ground the DSM-IV make this optimism halfhearted at best. Indeed,
preconceptions and categorizations may impact therapy processes
in subtle ways that shape our perception of the client and his or her
possibilities for change. It is well documented in the psychological
literature, for instance, that people tend to be biased toward
confirming rather than disconfirming hypotheses, and the manner
in which diagnostic labeling can negatively influence therapy has
also been discussed (e.g., Freeman & Dyer, 1993; Mills, 1989).
Perhaps Nickerson (1998, p. 183) best summarized this concern
when he stated:
Taxonomies that are invented as conceptual conveniences often
come to be seen as representing the way the world is really structured. Given the existence of a taxonomy, no matter how arbitrary, there is a tendency to view the world in terms of the
categories it provides.

Regardless of how we implement the DSM-IV in practical situations,
our use of it does not alter the fundamentally deterministic and
lawlike character of the theoretical system itself. In fact, if therapists
were to minimize the lawfulness of the DSM-IV categories, then the
system would lose its scientific thrust. In this case, psychotherapy
would forfeit its claim to scientific accuracy.
Another implication of a commitment to naturalistic explanation affects the character of the psychotherapeutic relationship.
From a naturalistic perspective, human beings are viewed as being
22

no different than other natural objects, all of which are presumed to
be governed by the laws of science. Hence, human beings (and their
gospel
pathologies) are objects worthy of scientific study. This is ultimately
Law
the justification for empirically validated treatments: practitioners
, and
ought to match certain disorders (natural phenomena) with certain
'Natural
treatments that have demonstrated predictable (i.e., lawful) scientific
Law
effectiveness. Just as in the physical sciences, where scientific achievement has resulted in technological advancements and mastery over
nature, we in the behavioral sciences hope for the same achievements and technological advancements in the realm of human
behavior (Slife & Williams, 1995). Psychotherapy becomes a means
of helping the client achieve mastery over the self through the
therapist's application of scientifically derived laws. From the perspective of naturalism, psychotherapy is not a relationship but an
applied technology founded upon scientific advancement.
A technology-based psychotherapy, however, is not equipped to
address questions of meaning and morality. Such moral questions
are premised upon teleology and purpose-the assumption that
there exists a higher aim or aspiration that one ought to strive for in
life. A technological psychotherapy premised upon natural lawfulness cannot, by definition, recognize such purposeful intention
(Guignon, 1992). A technological psychotherapy can only assist
clients in achieving certain ends as long as those ends seem realistic
and as long as they fall within the purview of scientific knowledge.
From this perspective, psychotherapists cannot ask what constitutes the "better" or more "worthy" life; the therapist's only duty
lies in applying the appropriate empirically validated treatments
that facilitate specific mastery skills. Such a psychotherapy is ultimately amoral and remains indifferent to the ends in themselves
(Guignon, 1992).
When moral considerations are removed from the reach of psychotherapy, spiritual considerations are excluded as well. In their
scientific commitments, the behavioral sciences adopted an image
of humanity defined by the lawfulness of nature. Within this naturalistic image, nothing of the sacred, religious, or spiritual can survive. Indeed, from this perspective, according to religious philosopher
Mircea Eliade (1961), we live in a "desacralized cosmos," a cosmos or
world that rejects the significance of the sacred and denies its
I
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manifestation. Consider the sacred phenomena of miracles, for
example. Miracles have traditionally been defined as supernatural
events or divine interventions that defy or radically alter the laws of
nature. From the perspective of a naturalistic universe, such nonnaturalistic explanations are viewed as primitive or unsophisticated
explanations that were invoked before the true laws of nature were
known. Hence, it follows that as we increase our "naturalistic"
knowledge of the world, nonnaturalistic and miraculous explanations ought to become obsolete. From this view, miraculous explanations are ultimately errors or misinterpretations of phenomena
that only the canons of science can accurately explain.
It follows, then, that a psychotherapist risks error in recognizing
the miraculous or the sacred at work in the life of the client and
in the course of therapy. For this reason, most therapists do not discuss miracles. Indeed, if therapists are committed to scientific and
naturalistic explanation, miracles do not seem to emerge at all.
Recognition of the miraculous requires recognition of the transcendence of the natural frame of things, and such transcendence is
impossible from a naturalistic perspective. Ultimately, the sacred
and miraculous cannot exist in the meaningless and causally determined spaces created by naturalism.
What Is Gospel Law!

The above-described loss of agency, meaning, morality, spirituality, and, indeed, anything that could reasonably be considered
part of human experience suggests to us not only that a natural law
conception is burdensome and unprofitable from a therapeutic perspective but also that it is contradictory to the precepts of the
restored gospel of Jesus Christ. The picture of humanity that
emerges from this naturalistic approach casts human beings as
automatons that are no more involved in the working out of the
substance of their own lives than would be any inanimate object
utterly subject to the nontheistic laws of nature.
The restored gospel provides a different picture of humanity
than this-one so vastly different that persons under the covenant
of God who have "put off the world" are sometimes referred to as
"peculiar" (McConkie, 1966, p. 565). Indeed, from a worldly perspective, Latter-day Saint doctrine is peculiar in that it ushers in a
24

concept of law that is in a sense incommensurable with the abovedescribed conception of natural law-or stated differently, gospel I
, gospel
law is of a different genre than the traditional scientific conception
Law
described above. Nonetheless, as we will now try to make clear, the
and
conception of law that we see in the scriptures (though of a different
'Natural
genre than other conceptions of law) has profound implications for
Law
our understanding of human existence and the more narrow topics
of counseling and psychotherapy-implications that stand in stark
contrast to the determinism described earlier.
Perhaps the first and most obvious message one receives as she
or he ponders the scriptures is that the concept of law is an integral
part of the unmistakably righteous and divine plan of God. In
Mormon Doctrine (1966, p. 433), Bruce R. McConkie stated:
Generally throughout the scriptures the term law has reference
to the "law of the Lord:' (Ps. 1:1-2.) That is, it means the statutes,
judgments, and principles of salvation revealed by the Lord from
time to time. In ancient Israel, for instance, the law was the law of
Moses-which was a preparatory gospel, a law of restrictions and
ordinances. To us the law is the law of Christ-which is the fulness of the gospel or "the perfect law of liberty." (Jas. 1:25.)
There are many such laws in the scriptures: the law of tithing, the
law of chastity, the law of consecration, and so forth. These are
the laws by which the children of God are blessed, guided, and
judged; they are ultimately the means by which we come unto the
Father and the Son.
Notice here that the idea of gospel law comes to us not as a set
of naturalistic principles that determine the whole of the universe
in the scientific manner described above-that is, in a strict way
that precludes the possibility of human agents acting other than
sinfully or virtuously (depending on the lawful regularities in
place)-but rather as the decrees of the Lord that we mayor may
not choose to follow. This is to say, the Lord provides us the way
unto him through his word and Spirit-through his mortal ministry, through ancient and modern prophets, through scripture, and
so forth. Persons on earth may always choose to not follow the
decrees of the Lord; they may choose to not follow the "strait and
narrow path" (1 Ne. 8:20) to borrow a phrase from the prophet Lehi.
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Indeed, it seems clear that the very idea of abiding or not abiding by
a gospel law is predicated on the notion that the children of God are
agents unto themselves-beings who may affirm a gospel law by
obeying it or deny that law by disobeying it. The agency described
here would seem to be the agency spoken of by the Lord in Doctrine
and Covenants 101:78: "That every man may act in doctrine and
principle pertaining to futurity, according to the moral agency
which I have given unto him, that every man may be accountable
for his own sins in the day of judgment." So it appears that the concept of gospel law actually demands moral agency.
Human Beings under Gospel Law
But what of the nature of the physical universe itself? That is,
irrespective of the sublime laws and covenants decreed by the Lord,
what of our scientific intuition that we are situated in a universe
determined by lawful necessity and uniform regularity? That is,
what of the brute facts of gravity, electromagnetism, Newton's laws
of motion, the laws of thermodynamics, and so forth? These phenomena are, after all, crucial aspects of the Enlightenmentspawned universe that have suggested the veracity of the doctrine
of determinism.
In response to this question, we first wish to stress that determinism per se is not an unequivocal fact of human existence; it is,
rather, a philosophical proposition or predicating assumption that
may be either accepted or rejected (James, 189711956, pp. 572-573;
Robinson, 1986, p. 432; Yanchar & Hill, 2003). Whether this proposition is accepted or rejected, of course, will have profound consequences for the theories we develop and the therapeutic practices
we employ, so it is crucial that practitioners and theorists consider
this matter, and the matter of lawfulness in general, very carefully
before advocating any particular position. In light of the fact that
determinism is a philosophical position that may be either accepted
or rejected, it seems easiest and most appropriate to refer to the
scriptures (once more), which suggest two things: (a) the Lord has
indeed granted us agency (as discussed above), and (b) the Lord is
the decree-er of the putatively "natural" laws, as well as the other
more commonly recognized gospel laws. Doctrine and Covenants
88:41-43 tells us:
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He comprehendeth all things, and all things are before him, and
all things are round about him; and he is above all things, and in all
things, and is through all things, and is round about all things;
and all things are by him, and of him, even God, forever and ever.
And again, verily I say unto you, he hath given a law unto all
things, by which they move in their times and their seasons; [a] nd
their courses are fixed, even the courses of the heavens and the
earth, which comprehend the earth and all the planets.
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This passage suggests that there are no laws pertaining to the physical universe that are not established or decreed by God for his
divine purposes.
The difference between an orderly, lawful universe with and
without God, then, is that natural law without God operates by
some kind of natural necessity where no exceptions are possible; for
any anomalous phenomenon (including human behavior), there
must exist some covering law, even if it has not yet been discovered.
Even if we never discover a respectable law covering a given anomaly, the assumption is made that such a law is nonetheless operative.
This assumption is taken as an "article of faith" of the traditional
scientific philosophy that presupposes laws of nature.
An orderly universe with God, on the other hand, is a universe
where God is the law as well as the exceptions to the law. Although
God's house is a "house of order," it is up to his will whether or not
gravity operates, even in particular situations or spatiotemporal
regions (it may not, as in the case of Christ's ascension or the parting of the Red Sea); whether or not the sick or afflicted can be
miraculously healed (they may be, as in the case of priesthood
blessings and Christ's many miracles); and so on. Of course, this list
gives only a small sample of "anomalies" in the scriptures that bear
witness of the flexibility of what we call laws of nature. From this
perspective, so-called laws seem to be as universal and immutable as
God wants them to be-they are nothing more, nothing less. In this
sense, the idea of natural law and gospel law might fit harmoniously
if natural law is understood as God's organization of, and operations in, the physical world that are subject to his will and that do
not obviate human agency.
The scriptures are also clear that the gospel does not amount to
some form of deism, where God merely sets the laws of the universe
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in motion and then exits the scene, allowing nature to take its
course without interaction or intervention. Rather, the scriptures
suggest that an embodied, loving, and involved God participates
with us as we conduct our lives here on earth. He is a god of miracles, a god who answers prayers through inspiration and through
his servants, as we read in Psalm SO:ls-"And call upon me in the
day of trouble: I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me"-and
in 4 Nephi l:S:
And there were great and marvelous works wrought by the
disciples of Jesus, insomuch that they did heal the sick, and raise
the dead, and cause the lame to walk, and the blind to receive
their sight, and the deaf to hear; and all manner of miracles did
they work among the children of men; and in nothing did they
work miracles save it were in the name of Jesus.

From the perspective we are advocating, then, we need not think in
terms of, nor feel beholden to, the traditional naturalistic concept of
lawfulness; rather, we can recognize that this is God's universe and
that any manifest lawfulness is, in fact, God's will.
Given our stance on lawfulness in the universe, we can make
several inferences about the nature of human beings. First, as stated
above, we have been given the gift of agency by our Father in
Heaven and thus are responsible for our actions. With this gift of
agency, any action will have been chosen from a larger (though limited) set of possibilities, and a sin need not have been committed.
The existence of agency makes good on William James's concern
that human regret be viewed as the product of avoidable error,
which, in turn, leads to the optimistic possibility that we may
increasingly avoid sin and error in the future-that we may always
ameliorate our conduct through repentance and by virtue of
Christ's atonement.
Second, human agency allows for the possibility of meaning
and morality in our lives. Because we can freely and thoughtfully
choose among the alternatives afforded by our immediate circumstances and the broader context of our lives, there is an intrinsic
meaningfulness to our conduct. Our actions mean something
because we intended certain things while ruling out other possibilities, hopefully of less worth or virtue. Moreover, acts can be judged
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as moral or otherwise because we have the capacity to freely recognize vice and virtue and to act for the sake of one rather than the
other. Understood this way, a moral act might be construed as one
where the will (or explicit direction) of God is followed, although
the possibility existed for it to not be followed.
Psychotherapy under Gospel Law
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If we accept the notion that human beings are the agentive
children of a participating god who decrees the laws of the gospel,
including those that appear to be natural laws, what then do we
assume about the enterprise of counseling and psychotherapy?
First, we assume that clients have agency. They have the capacity to
generate meaning and to act for the sake of that meaning. Clients
are never lawfully determined by their pathologies or past events or
traumas. Certainly, these kinds of phenomena occur and contribute to human experience. However, these phenomena do not
necessarily determine the lives of human beings. Rather, clients
actively bestow meaning to such phenomena and, through their
agency, establish for themselves the significance and impact of life
events. Indeed, God's gift of agency allows for the generation of
such meanings.
In this sense, agency allows for the "possibility of possibility"the possibility of options and change (Slife, 1994). No matter how
rigid and seemingly fixed a client's behaviors might be, the possibility of behaving otherwise always exists. Of course, this is not to say
that such a rigid and fixed client would necessarily change. As therapists, we cannot force clients to change. Indeed, such change is ultimately in the hands of God and the client. However, under gospel
law, clients always hold the possibility for change through Christ,
and as therapists we should not abandon our hopefulness for such a
possibility. Moreover, God may work among humans in other ways,
such as by providing empathy, understanding, and insight or by
softening hearts or by providing trials that ultimately refine character and strengthen faith.
Of course, as was discussed previously, many therapists already
endorse agency as an indispensable feature of psychotherapy and
the change process (Jensen & Bergin, 1988). However, the agency
and the freedom to generate meanings and choices that many
29
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therapists endorse may be of at least one of two kinds: humancentered agency or Christ-centered agency.
If people generate meanings and choices independently
through their own originative sources of meaning and action, then
agency is human-centered. Human-centered agency ultimately
leads to a relativistic world comprised of a plurality of subjectively
defined meanings, none of which can be viewed as "better" or
"higher" than any others (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). In
therapy, for instance, clients are often encouraged to create their
own meanings and choices. However, when these meanings and
choices are human-centered-when they emanate from the client's
own authentic and individual center-the therapist cannot challenge the client's choice. From the standpoint of human-centered
agency, all client choices are "good" choices as long as they are realistic and self-generated. In other words, the "best" choice for the
client is one that is individually and independently conceived by
the client. When all independent client choices are "good," none can
be better or worse. Ultimately, then, the potential virtue of such
choices cannot be examined.
In contrast, Christ-centered agency through gospel law allows
for an exploration of the moral dimension of choice. Hence, the
second implication for therapy under gospel law is the inclusion of
an unmistakably moral dimension to psychotherapy. Gospel law
not only allows for agency but provides an orientation or grounding
for how one ought to live. Gospel law establishes the boundaries of
a "better" and "higher" existence as exemplified in the life of Christ.
Therefore, Christ-centered values provide the standards and
parameters of the good and worthy life. Psychotherapy under
gospel law incorporates Christ-centered values as the foundation
for psychotherapy. That is, Christ-centered values are the values of
psychotherapy-the values that define therapists' broader notions
of psychological health. For instance, the divinely inspired words of
the Apostle Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians encourage us to
act with charity, the pure love of Christ, in all aspects of our lives, as
therapists or otherwise.
Under gospel law, our therapeutic work with clients is always
and already informed by Christ-centered values like charity, hope, and
love. Being "loving" in this manner emphasizes one's obligations to

others before the self; facilitating client insight and behavior
premised upon this Christ-centered value is viewed as the highest
gospel
and most ethical behavior for clients (and therapists). Therefore,
Law
not only can clients (and therapists) choose to be loving, but they
and
have a responsibility to do so, as indicated by gospel law and by
, 'Natural
virtue of their agency.
Law
That psychotherapy is a value-laden enterprise is well documented in the academic literature (Bergin, 1980; Beutler & Bergan,
1991; London, 1986; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Tjelveit,
1999). Psychotherapy values are inescapable, and psychotherapists'
values, whether held implicitly or explicitly, impact clients. So the
-issue is not whether a counselor endorses values; the issue is what
kind of values a counselor endorses. From our perspective, the best
psychotherapy values are Christ-centered values.
A third implication of gospel law for clinical practice is allowing
for the emergence of the sacred and the miraculous. Recall from our
previous discussion that miracles are traditionally defined as supernatural events that contradict the laws of nature. However, as the psychological historian Van den Berg (1961) argued, miracles are required
to defy the laws of nature only when nature itself is described as
lawfully and ontologically prior to religion. He suggested two
things: (a) we can conceive of the naturalistic perspective as the
interloper that has changed the way we look at God's creations, and
(b) we cannot reasonably expect to see God if we assume a determined, mechanized, and mathematical nature that by definition
omits the possibility of his presence.
The philosopher of religion Mircea Eliade (1961) described this
determined and mechanized view of nature (i.e., natural law) as
"profane space" (p. 22). Profane space, as contrasted with "sacred
space," is devoid of miracles and is characterized as "homogeneous"
and "neutral" (p. 22). That is, the profane space of natural law is
neutral and meaningless. No space is qualitatively different or
unique in comparison to any other space in nature. The possibility
of such uniqueness or qualitative difference is characteristic only of
sacred space. Eliade (1961) stated:
For religious man, space is not homogenous; he experiences
interruptions, breaks in it; some parts of space are qualitatively
different from others. "Draw not nigh hither;' says the Lord to
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Moses. "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon
thou standest is holy ground." (p. 20; see also Ex. 3:5)
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The space in which Moses stands is not neutral. Indeed, it is sacred
space-space that is infused with meaning and purpose as defined
by God.
By contrast, profane space cannot possess human meaningfulness, nor can it provide direction or orientation for its inhabitants,
because it is neutral. This is to suggest that profane space-natural
space-denies the presence of God. Indeed, God can be with us
only when we allow his presence to unfold in us and when we allow
ourselves to see God's presence in others. However, the idea of
sacred space seems possible and important only from a nonnaturalistic perspective that grants the existence of the sacred.
Therapy under gospel law acknowledges the presence of the
sacred from the outset. Clients are viewed, not as determined natural objects, but as spirit children of God who already reflect and
glorify him. Clients' sacredness, as spirit children of God, extends
beyond a diagnostic system that assumes behavior is determined
by natural laws; clients, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere
instances of diagnostic categories. From a gospel perspective, then,
diagnostic categories, which are only our limited theoretical
attempts to make clients' behavior comprehensible, should be held
tentatively, not absolutely (Slife & Reber, 2001). The diagnostic
categories never provide an exhaustive picture of clients, because
clients-as spirit children of God with a divine potential-always
have possibilities available to them that transcend the parameters
of any particular category.
The sacred gifts of God, including the atonement of Jesus
Christ, miracles, and moral agency, are what make therapeutic
change possible. Such sacredness-Christ's work in us-allows
clients to overcome psychological traumas, heal wounds, and
implement life changes that would be considered unlikely or impossible from a naturalistic view. The therapeutic cases that particularly
embody this sacredness and possibility for change are cases wherein
the client exceeds the therapist's expectations. These are the therapy
cases that surprise practitioners. Perhaps the client experiences profound insights that radically alter perceptions of reality, resulting in
changes that no one in the life of the client (therapist included) had

imagined possible. Haven't we all experienced such cases? From the
vantage point of gospel law, these are the cases in which miraclesmanifestations of the sacred-occur.
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